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Abstract 
Economists’ most basic model for studying Social Security policy issues is the so—called 
life—cycle model of saving behavior. This paper sets up a life—cycle model in which a 
household simultaneously chooses its lifetime consumption profile and retirement age. 
The paper calibrates parameters from Consumer Expenditure Survey data, making special 
use of observations of changes in household consumption immediately following 
retirement. The paper’s last section provides illustrative simulations of the effect of 
current Social Security provisions on average retirement ages, finding evidence of a 
several year reduction in working life in some cases. 
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Economists’ workhorse dynamic framework for studying social security policy is-
sues, national debt, and tax policy in general is the life—cycle saving model (e.g.,
Modigliani [1986], Diamond [1965], Tobin [1967], Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], and many
others). Even analyses which incorporate bequests — in order to study the role of excep-
tionally wealthy families, for example – often rely on life—cycle saving as a model of the
behavior of most households (e.g., Altig et al. [2001], Gookhale et al. [2001], Laitner [2001b,
2002]). The simplest life—cycle model merely describes household saving in youth and mid-
dle age, in preparation for retirement, and dissaving in old age. Although one can easily
extend the framework to household choices over labor/leisure hours (e.g., Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ [1987], Gustman and Steinmeier [1986], etc.), basic utility—function coeﬃcients
are not easily calibrated for the simplest model (utility is not, after all, directly observable),
and, since extensions introduce still more parameters, one might worry about the possi-
bility of calibrating them accurately. This paper, however, proposes that we can employ
evidence on behavior immediately after retirement to attempt to estimate key features of
life—cycle preference orderings. The analysis suggests that as we augment the model to
include labor/leisure decisions, the set of implications about household behavior expands
in such a way that opportunities to calibrate parameters grows faster than the number
of parameters. Based on our calibrations, this paper’s last section provides illustrative
simulations of the eﬀect of social security taxes and beneﬁts on retirement ages.
A number of recent papers document a drop in household consumption at retirement.
Some suggest the decline may be inconsistent with the life—cycle theory’s assumptions of ra-
tional behavior and careful planning.1,2 Others, however, suggest that the drop represents
intentional behavior. For example, Hurd and Rohwedder [2003] use novel questions on
anticipations from a subsample of Health and Retirement Study participants to show that
households expect their consumption to fall about 20% at retirement. Similarly, ﬁnancial
advisors have long said that retirees have less “need” for consumption than working people
– for instance, Laitner [2001a] quotes a TIAA—CREF brochure suggesting “you’ll need
60 to 90 percent of current income in retirement, adjusted for inﬂation, to maintain the
1 Bernheim et al. [2001] examine consumption declines using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics 1978—90. Data limitations force them to proxy consumption with food at home,
food away from home, and rental value of home. Their Table 1 shows a consumption drop
averaging 14% in the ﬁrst two years after retirement — though the decline seems to build
during retirement, perhaps averaging 9% in the ﬁrst year and 18%, cumulatively, in the
second. Table 3 implies the magnitude of the decline is negatively related to asset and
pension resources. Bernheim et al. seem to favor explanations based on poor planning.
2 Using British data, Banks et al. [1998, tab.1] measure consumption declines at retire-
ment of 22 to 35%. The authors suggest that individuals may tend to overestimate their
pension entitlements (e.g., p.784).
1lifestyle you now lead,” and a Reader’s Digest article stating that “many ﬁnancial planners
say it will take 70 to 80 percent of your current income to maintain your standard of living
when you retire.”
The ﬁrst part of the present paper examines evidence from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey 1983—2001 and ﬁnds that household consumption does indeed fall substantially, on
average, at retirement. The second part argues that not only is the evidence consistent
with variants of many widely used life—cycle models but also that measurements of the
size of the post—retirement drop in consumption can reveal valuable information about the
magnitude of life—cycle model parameters.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 1 considers the possible struc-
ture of simple life—cycle saving models which incorporate labor/leisure choices. Section 2
examines U.S. data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, using it to assess the possible
life—cycle shape of household consumption proﬁles. Section 3 sets up a life—cycle model of
family behavior with nonseparable consumption and leisure, and Section 4 calibrates the
parameters of the latter model. Section 5 uses the new parameter estimates to attempt to
assess the impact of social security on household decisions of when to retire.
1. Household Preferences
In this paper’s model, every household chooses its saving and labor supply to maximize
its utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint.3 The analysis assumes indivisibilities
in options for market work: our households must either work full time or retire (see, for
example, Hurd [1996]). As Rust and Phelan [1997,p.786] write,
The ﬁnding that most workers make discontinuous transitions from full time
work to not working, and the ﬁnding that the majority of the relatively small
number of ‘gradual retirees’ reduce their annual hours of work by taking on a
sequence of lower wage partial retirement ‘bridge jobs’ rather than gradually
reducing hours of work at their full-time pre-retirement ‘career job’ suggests the
existence of explicit or implicit constraints on the individual’s choice of hours of
work.
The indivisibility assumption seems consistent with the fact that U.S. data show little trend
in male work hours or participation rates after 1940, except for earlier retirement (e.g.,
Pencavel [1986], Blundell et al. [1999], and Burkhauser et al. [1999]). We omit sensitivity
of utility or earning power to health status – the latter being a topic for future research.
Although some analyses stress the importance of features of workers’ private pension plans
in determining retirement behavior (e.g., Stock and Wise [1990]), this paper takes the
opposite point of view: this paper assumes that a worker picks an employer whose pension
3 The option to save (and dissave) contrasts to Stock and Wise [1990] and Rust and
Phelan [1997], where households live pre-retirement on their earnings, and post-retirement
on their social security and pension beneﬁts. Lumsdaine and Mitchell [1999] ﬁnd, however,
that Health and Retirement Study respondents in 1992, all of whom are near retirement,
have median net worth of $500,000. Although oneq u a r t e ro ft h ea m o u n ti ss o c i a ls e c u r i t y
wealth, and another quarter is private pension wealth, half is from other sources.
2plan matches his requirements and/or that employers design their pension—plan options in
accordance with worker preferences in the ﬁrst place; thus, private pensions form a part
of private wealth accumulation and do not require separate attention.4 Economists adopt
various simpliﬁcations about preference orderings for their models of household behavior.
Since the implications of such assumptions can be very signiﬁcant for the data on which
this paper focuses, we begin with a comparison of speciﬁcations.
Many economic models employ utility functions which are time separable, and many
ﬁnd an additional assumption that concurrent leisure and consumption are separable nat-
ural as well (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier [1986], Anderson et al. [1999]). Concurrent
separability, however, certainly restricts a model’s range of outcomes. Consider a speciﬁc
example. Retirement is exogenously set (at this point). A household lives from t =0t o
t =2 ,r e t i r i n ga tt = 1. Its time endowment at each t is 1. When it works, its leisure
falls to ¯   ∈ (0,1). This paper assumes that indivisibilities force ¯   to be a ﬁxed parameter.
The wage is W; the interest rate is r. The household’s consumption ct yields utility ﬂow
u(ct); its leisure  t yields utility ﬂow v( t) ;a n d ,i t sa s s e t s( n e tw o r t h )a r eat. Think of the
household’s behavior as originating from
max
ct, t
8 2
0
[u(ct)+v( t)]dt (1)
subject to:  t =
F
¯  , for t ≤ 1
1, for t>1
,
˙ at = r · at +( 1−  t) · W − ct ,
a0 =0=a2 .
Provided u(.)i sc o n c a v e ,s p e c i ﬁcation (1) predicts that consumption will change continu-
ously with age. To see this, note along an optimal consumption path, the additional utility
at date s from one extra dollar’s consumption, u (cs), must equal the additional utility
from the dollar if it is saved until later date t, by which time it has grown to an amount
er·(t−s):
u (cs)=er·(t−s) · u (ct). (2)
Letting ct− be consumption the instant before t,a n dct+ the instant after, condition (2)
yields
u (ct−)=u (ct+). (3)
The latter is inconsistent with a jump in consumption at any t.
4 In fact, the central aim of this paper – to calibrate the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution from post—retirement consumption – does not depend on our treatment of
private pensions. However, this paper’s exposition does.
3Other papers assume intertemporal separability but not intra-temporal separability.5
A well—known example is Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987]. We can easily modify example (1)
to illustrate. Let a household have a constant returns to scale “neoclassical” production
function f : R2  → R1 which combines current consumption and leisure to generate a ﬂow
of services, the latter yielding a ﬂow of utility, say, u(f). The household solves
max
ct, t
8 2
0
u(f(ct, t))dt (4)
subject to:  t =
F
¯  , for t ≤ 1
1, for t>1
,
˙ at = r · at +( 1−  t) · W − ct ,
a0 =0=a2 .
As before, post—retirement leisure is 1, pre-retirement leisure is ¯   < 1, and we ﬁxt h e
retirement age to be t = 1. Since a bivariate neoclassical production function has f12(.) > 0,
inputs are complementary in the sense that more leisure (consumption) raises the marginal
product of consumption (leisure). If u(.) is linear, this would make the household want to
step up its consumption at retirement: consumption would discontinuously increase after
t h ed i s c r e t er i s ei nl e i s u r ea tr e t i r e m e n tb e c a u s et h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to fc o n s u m p t i o nr i s e s .
If, on the other hand, u(.) is very concave, a household would strongly desire a very even
ﬂow of consumption services at diﬀerent ages. Since the household produces such services
more easily during retirement, it may then choose more consumption prior to t =1 .I nt h e
end, rational behavior may lead to an age proﬁle of consumption which discontinuously
changes in either direction at retirement.
To be more speciﬁc, let f(.) have the familiar Cobb—Douglas form
f(c, )=[ c]α · [ ]1−α, α ∈ (0,1).
Let u(.) have the familiar isoelastic form
u(f)=
[f]γ
γ
, γ < 1.
Condition (3) at retirement date t =1i s
([ct−]α · [¯  ]1−α)γ−1 · α · [ct−]α−1 · [¯  ]1−α =( [ ct+]α)γ−1 · α · [ct+]α−1 ⇐⇒
[ct−]α·γ−1 · [¯  ](1−α)·γ =[ ct+]α·γ−1 ⇐⇒
[ct−] · [¯  ]
−
γ·(1−α)
1−α·γ =[ ct+]. (5)
5 E.g., King et al. [1988], Hurd and Rohwedder [2003].
4If γ is nearly 1, u(.)i sn e a r l yl i n e a r .T h e nw ew o u l de x p e c ta nu p w a r dj u m pi nc o n s u m p t i o n
at retirement. In fact,
ct− <c t+ if [¯  ]
−
γ·(1−α)
1−α·γ > 1 ⇐⇒
−
γ · (1 − α)
1 − α · γ
< 0 ⇐⇒
γ > 0.
So, indeed, whenever γ > 0, under rational planning, consumption discontinuously rises at
retirement . On the other hand, we have
ct− >c t+ if [¯  ]
−
γ·(1−α)
1−α·γ < 1 ⇐⇒
−
γ · (1 − α)
1 − α · γ
> 0 ⇐⇒
γ < 0.
Thus, whenever γ < 0, the model predicts a discontinuous drop in consumption at re-
tirement. Not only is an abrupt adjustment in consumption at retirement fully consistent
with rational behavior, but also we can see that data on the size of change can potentially
help us to calibrate γ –a no t h e r w i s ed i ﬃcult task.
2. Consumer Expenditure Survey
The most complete source of disaggregate consumption data for the U.S. is the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CXS). The CXS has respondent households collect extensive
diary information on small purchases over a multi—week time period. It conducts interviews
at longer intervals asking about major purchases. The interviews also collect demographic
data, data on current income, on value of house, etc. The sample is large (the BLS uses
the survey in setting the CPI). The survey was conducted at multi—year intervals prior to
1984, and annually thereafter. The web site is
http://stats.bls.gov.gov/csxhome.htm .
The following discussion uses, at this point, data from the site’s “standard tables” for
1984—2001.
Tables 1—3 compare National Income and Product Account (NIPA) personal con-
sumption for 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 with population—weighted totals from the CXS
for similar categories. The following observations seem justiﬁed. (A) For categories such
as food, apparel, personal care, and recreation, the CXS captures 65—75% of the NIPA
ﬁgures in 1985; the CXS captures about 110% of 1985 NIPA transportation (primarily
private automobiles). (B) Other categories diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two sources
in terms of deﬁnition. NIPA “shelter” imputes service ﬂows to owner occupied houses,
whereas CXS housing does not. NIPA “medical care” is the output of the private medi-
cal sector, but CXS medical care is private households p e n d i n go nt h es a m e–e x c l u d i n g
5Table 1. National Income and Product Accounts Personal
Consumption for 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000
(billions of current dollars)a
Category 1985 1990 1995 2000
foodb 498.5 677.9 802.5 1027.2
apparel 188.3 261.7 317.3 409.8
personal care 37.6 53.7 67.4 87.8
shelter 406.8 585.6 740.8 960.0
household operation 344.0 433.6 555.0 723.9
transportation 372.8 455.4 560.3 768.9
medical care 367.4 619.7 888.6 1171.1
recreation 187.6 284.9 401.6 564.7
education 53.8 83.7 114.5 164.0
personal business 188.1 284.7 406.8 632.5
miscellaneousc 67.9 90.8 114.2 174.0
total 2712.6 3831.5 4969.0 6683.7
a. Source: http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/AllTables.asp,
Section 2, Table 2.4.
b. Includes tobacco and alcohol.
c. Includes religious activities and foreign travel.
employer contributions to private medical insurance. The CXS measures household out-
lays on education such as tuition; the corresponding NIPA category includes the entire
output (i.e., the entire cost of operation) of the education and private foundation sectors
(less government grants). NIPA “personal business” includes the output of the ﬁnancial
services sector, much of which households implicitly support through low interest on bank
accounts, etc.; CXS “personal business” is completely diﬀerent – it includes household
payments for life insurance and pensions. CXS “miscellaneous” consumption incorporates
household cash contributions to charity and alimony payments, whereas the same NIPA
category does not. (C) CXS totals slip at an annual rate of 1.7% relative to NIPA personal
consumption – perhaps the BLS is having more and more diﬃculty obtaining accurate
responses.
Although the CXS data seems to have its share of problems, it has the virtues of
comprehensiveness and of providing age—related detail; hence, this paper uses it – after
adjusting it in several ways. The “adjustments” are as follows. (1) We drop mortgage
payments from “shelter” but substitute NIPA housing service ﬂo w sa s s i g n e dt oa g e si n
proportion to relative CXS—reported housing values. (2) We drop “personal business” –
for which the BLS deﬁnition diﬀers greatly from the NIPA, and for which the BLS data
6Table 2. Consumer Expenditure Survey Consumption
(billions of current dollars)a
Category 1985 1990 1995 2000
foodb 366.4 471.6 520.9 639.7
apparel 130.0 156.9 175.7 203.0
personal care 27.7 35.3 41.6 61.7
shelter 351.0 468.9 611.3 778.0
household operation 297.9 375.0 467.1 569.3
transportation 420.0 496.5 620.2 811.2
medical care 101.5 143.5 178.6 226.0
recreationc 120.0 152.7 182.9 219.7
education 29.4 39.4 48.6 69.1
personal businessd 184.6 251.3 305.7 368.0
miscellaneouse 122.1 160.8 174.4 215.2
total 2150.8 2752.0 3327.2 4160.9
a. Source: http://stats.bls.gov/csxhome.htm, “one year standard
tables.”
b. Includes tobacco and alcohol.
c. Includes entertainment and reading.
d. Includes personal insurance and pensions.
e. Includes cash contributions.
includes pension contributions (which correspond to saving rather than consumption in
our framework of analysis). (3) For rows in which Tables 1—2 are very similar – food,
apparel, personal care, household operation, transportation, and recreation – we propor-
tionately adjust CXS values so that category (weighted) totals coincide with NIPA ﬁgures.
(4) We proportionately scale the remaining CXS categories – medical care, education,
and miscellaneous – with an arithmetic average of the scaling factors from adjustment 3.
Table 4 presents CXS data on consumption and income by age and this paper’s ad-
justed consumption. Website tables present average data for (10—year wide) age groups.
Table 4 interpolates consumption and after—tax income ﬁgures for each age in each year;
then it computes rates of change of consumption for each year t and age s, taking, for
example the age—25 consumption in 1984 away from the age—26 consumption in 1985 to
derive ∆ln(c25,1985); ﬁnally, for each age s =2 5 ,...,7 5 ,i tr e p o r t st h em e a no ft h e1 3
available ∆ln(cst) annual ﬁgures, t = 1984,...,2000, as ∆ln(cs). It does the same for
CXS—reported household income and for this paper’s adjusted household consumption.
Figure 1 plots the consumption and income changes.6 Carroll and Summers [1991] note
6 T h i si st h eo n l yp l a c ei nw h i c hw eu s et h eB L Sm e a s u r eo fi n c o m e .
7Table 3. Consumer Expenditure Amount ÷ NIPA Amount
(percent)a
Category 1985 1990 1995 2000
food 73.5 69.6 64.9 62.3
apparel 69.0 60.0 55.4 49.5
personal care 73.8 65.7 61.7 70.3
shelter 86.3 80.1 82.5 81.0
household operation 86.6 86.5 84.2 78.6
transportation 112.7 109.0 110.7 105.5
medical care 27.6 23.2 20.1 19.3
recreation 64.0 53.6 45.6 38.9
education 54.6 47.0 42.4 42.1
personal business 98.1 88.3 75.1 58.2
miscellaneous 179.9 177.1 152.7 123.7
total 79.3 71.8 67.0 62.3
a. Source: see Tables 1—2.
that consumption and income grow at the same high rate for early ages in the CXS,a n d
they suggest that liquidity constraints may play a role. Browning and others, in contrast,
argue that children’s births, and children’s departures to form new households, lead to
high, then low, consumption growth rates as parent households age. When Mariger [1986]
considers these hypotheses together, he concludes that demographics may be the more
important factor.
In fact, for ages less than 30, the following scenario presumably dominates the data:
Mr. M, with annual income of $10,000 and consumption of $8,000, marries Miss F, who
has annual income of $10,000 and consumption of $8,000, and the next year they constitute
a married household MF with income $20,000 and consumption $16,000. Thus, marriage
can cause average per household consumption and income to skyrocket.
To bypass changes due strictly to marriage, this paper concentrates on households
of ages 30—75 or 35—75. Issues of children and liquidity constraints remain potentially
important. The rest of this section seeks to measure the role of children but ignores
possible liquidity constraints; the next section returns to the latter.
To incorporate children into our analysis, let the number of “equivalent adults” per
household be nt. For example, if a household has two parents, let parent each constitute 1
“equivalent adult.” Suppose children consume 50% as much as adults. Then a two—child
family with two parents might have nt = 3 for parent ages t at which the children remain
at home. Following Tobin [1967] and others, let household’s utility ﬂow at age t be
8Table 4. Consumer Expenditure Survey Data: Growth Rates for
Real Consumption and Real Incomea
Age Consumptionb Adjusted Incomed
Consumptionc
25 0.0690 0.0729 0.1025
26 0.0652 0.0696 0.0962
27 0.0619 0.0666 0.0909
28 0.0589 0.0639 0.0863
29 0.0503 0.0573 0.0733
30 0.0306 0.0425 0.0449
31 0.0295 0.0411 0.0436
32 0.0284 0.0397 0.0424
33 0.0274 0.0384 0.0413
34 0.0265 0.0372 0.0402
35 0.0255 0.0360 0.0391
36 0.0246 0.0349 0.0381
37 0.0238 0.0339 0.0372
38 0.0230 0.0329 0.0363
39 0.0126 0.0226 0.0254
40 0.0077 0.0179 0.0206
41 0.0077 0.0180 0.0206
42 0.0077 0.0180 0.0207
43 0.0077 0.0181 0.0207
44 0.0076 0.0182 0.0207
45 0.0076 0.0182 0.0208
46 0.0076 0.0183 0.0208
47 0.0076 0.0183 0.0208
48 0.0076 0.0184 0.0209
49 -0.0110 0.0015 0.0003
50 -0.0159 -0.0028 -0.0049
51 -0.0160 -0.0027 -0.0054
52 -0.0161 -0.0027 -0.0058
53 -0.0162 -0.0026 -0.0063
54 -0.0163 -0.0025 -0.0068
55 -0.0164 -0.0024 -0.0073
56 -0.0165 -0.0023 -0.0078
57 -0.0167 -0.0023 -0.0084
58 -0.0168 -0.0022 -0.0089
59 -0.0190 -0.0031 -0.0165
9Table 4. Consumer Expenditure Survey Data: Growth Rates for
Real Consumption and Real Incomea
Age Consumptionb Adjusted Incomed
Consumptionc
60 -0.0207 -0.0035 -0.0230
61 -0.0208 -0.0029 -0.0243
62 -0.0209 -0.0023 -0.0257
63 -0.0210 -0.0016 -0.0272
64 -0.0211 -0.0009 -0.0288
65 -0.0212 -0.0002 -0.0306
66 -0.0213 0.0005 -0.0325
67 -0.0214 0.0013 -0.0347
68 -0.0215 0.0021 -0.0371
69 -0.0137 0.0042 -0.0176
70 -0.0105 0.0047 -0.0088
71 -0.0109 0.0043 -0.0096
72 -0.0113 0.0038 -0.0104
73 -0.0118 0.0034 -0.0112
74 -0.0123 0.0029 -0.0121
75 -0.0128 0.0024 -0.0130
a. Source: see Table 2. All nominal amounts deﬂated with NIPA
personal consumption chain index.
b. Log real consumption age i +1a tt +1l e s ss a m ea g ei at t
for t = 1984,...,1996.
c. Drops pension and social security contributions, drops mortgage
payments, adds service ﬂow from owner occupied dwellings. See text.
d. Same formula (and deﬂator) as consumption.
nt · u(
ft
nt
).
T h en e wv e r s i o no fo u rl i f e — c y c le maximization model allows nt  = 1 and allows a household
to choose its retirement age R.I f t h e a g e o f d e a t h i s T, and if households discount the
future at subjective discount rate ρ, replace (4) with
max
ct,R
8 T
0
e−ρ·t · nt · u(
f(ct, t)
nt
)dt (6)
subject to:  t =
F
¯  , for t ≤ R
1, for t>R
,
10FIG 1. CXS LOG DIFFERENCES ADJUSTED CONSUMPTION AND INCOME, 1984--2001
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˙ at = r · at +( 1−  t) · Wt − ct ,
a0 =0=aT .
As before, let f(.) be Cobb—Douglas, and let u(.) be isoelastic. The Euler equation (e.g.,
(2)—(3)) yields
[ct]α·γ−1 · [nt]1−γ = er−ρ · [ct+1]α·γ−1 · [nt+1]1−γ for t  = R,R − 1,
[ct]α·γ−1 · [nt]1−γ · [¯  ]γ·(1−α) = er−ρ · [ct+1]α·γ−1 · [nt+1]1−γ for t = R. (7)
If
11χt(R)=
F
1, if t = R
0, if t  = R
,
and if
∆xt ≡ xt+1 − xt and ∆ln(xt) ≡ ln(xt+1) − ln(xt),
the Euler equation implies
∆ln(ct)=
1
1 − α · γ
· (r − ρ)+
1 − γ
1 − α · γ
· ∆ln(nt) − χt(R) ·
γ · (1 − α)
1 − α · γ
· ln(¯  ). (8)
In practice, each household in our data has at least one adult, and it may have two (or,
with grandparents, for instance, even more). Normalize the ﬁrst adult’s equivalency weight
to one. Let nA
t and nC
t be the number of additional adults and the number of children,
respectively, in a household when the ﬁrst adult’s age is t.L e tξA and ξC, respectively, be
the adult equivalency of adults beyond the ﬁrst and of each child. Although ξA may be 1,
it could also be substantially less than this if there are scale economies for consolidating
single—adult households. We have
nt =1+ξA · nA
t + ξC · nC
t .
Then the following approximates (8)
∆ln(ct) ≈
1
1 − α · γ
· (r − ρ)+
1 − γ
1 − α · γ
· ξC · ∆nC
t +
1 − γ
1 − α · γ
· ξA · ∆nA
t
− χt(R) ·
γ · (1 − α)
1 − α · γ
· ln(¯  ). (9)
We use a regression equation based on (9) to summarize our adjusted CXS data.
Equation (9) applies to an individual household. Since the CXS lacks a panel structure,
we estimate population averages for each time and age group. Our dependent variable is
the diﬀerence of the logs of the averages. For example, we compute average “adjusted”
consumption for age s at time t,s a y ,¯ cst.T h e nw eﬁnd average adjusted consumption for
age s +1a tt +1a n ds e t
∆ln(¯ cst)=l n ( ¯ cs+1,t+1) − ln(¯ cst).
This is our regression’s dependent variable.
Our ﬁrst independent variable is a constant. Turning to demographic information,
the CXS measures average numbers of people per household and numbers of children
under 18. Our “adults” per household equal “people” minus children under 18. Our
second independent variable is ∆¯ nC
st, the average number of children (under 18) in age
s + 1 households at time t + 1 less the average for age s households at t, etc. Our third
12independent variable, ∆¯ nA
st, measures changes in adults per household. Our fourth variable,
∆ ¯ Rst, is the average proportion of retired males of age s+1att+1 minus the average for
age s at time t.7 We add a time dummy, say, Dt, for each year 1984—2000, constraining the
sum of the coeﬃcients on the dummies to equal 0. Appending an error to the right—hand
side of (9) – capturing measurement error in consumption – our regression equation is
∆ln(¯ cit)=β0 + β1 · ∆¯ nC
it + β2 · ∆¯ nA
it + β3 · ∆ ¯ Rit+
β4 · D1984 + ... + β19 · D1999 − (β4 + ... + β19) · D2000 +  it . (10)
Table 5 relates the regression coeﬃcients to the parameters of our theoretical model.
Table 5. Regression Coeﬃcients and the Model’s Parametersa
Regression Coeﬃcient Theoretical Coeﬃcient
β0 (r − ρ)/(1 − α · γ)
β1 ξC · (1 − γ)/(1 − α · γ)
β2 ξA · (1 − γ)/(1 − α · γ)
β3 −[(γ · (1 − α))/(1 − α · γ)] · ln(¯  )
a. See equations (8)—(9).
Tables 6a—b present regression results; the next section interprets the estimates in more
detail.8 The signs of the constants imply that a household’s consumption per equivalent
7 See Fullerton [1999] and the data on male retirement ages at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ep/labor.force/clra8000.txt.
8 Since the data at this point has been constructed using interpolation, the standard
errors are not trustworthy. The next revision will use data on individual ages rather than
the “standard tables.”
13Table 6a. OLS Log Diﬀerence Adjusted Real Consumption,
Ages 30—75, Times 1984—2000, Regressed on Diﬀerenced Number of
Children, Adults (beyond the ﬁrst), and Retirement Rate
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. Error T-Stat
CONSTANT 0.0214 0.0011 19.4179
CHANGE CHILDREN 0.1341 0.0166 8.0725
CHANGE ADULTS 0.2146 0.0187 11.4776
CHANGE MALE -0.2716 0.0392 -6.9326
PARTICIPATIONa
1984 0.0168 0.0034 4.9533
1985 0.0005 0.0033 0.1573
1986 0.0037 0.0031 1.1710
1987 -0.0073 0.0031 -2.3270
1988 0.0051 0.0031 1.6229
1989 -0.0218 0.0033 -6.7052
1990 -0.0422 0.0031 -13.4402
1991 -0.0136 0.0032 -4.2674
1992 0.0214 0.0031 6.8320
1993 0.0106 0.0033 3.2408
1994 -0.0234 0.0032 -7.2513
1995 0.0069 0.0031 2.2012
1996 0.0009 0.0031 0.2827
1997 0.0218 0.0031 6.9374
1998 0.0202 0.0031 6.4502
1999 -0.0060 0.0031 -1.9348
AOV
SSQ regression 0.4094 deg. freedom 19
SSQ error 0.3591 deg. freedom 762
SSQ total 0.7684 deg. freedom 781
R squared 53.2739
a. Decline in male labor force participation post age 49.
14Table 6b. OLS Log Diﬀerence Adjusted Real Consumption,
Ages 35—75, Times 1984—2000, Regressed on Diﬀerenced Number of
Children, Adults (beyond the ﬁrst), and Retirement Rate
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. Error T-Stat
CONSTANT 0.0176 0.0013 13.7319
CHANGE CHILDREN 0.0864 0.0184 4.6872
CHANGE ADULTS 0.1873 0.0191 9.7947
CHANGE MALE -0.2359 0.0389 -6.0708
PARTICIPATION
1984 0.0176 0.0034 5.1273
1985 -0.0021 0.0034 -0.6338
1986 0.0038 0.0032 1.1945
1987 -0.0113 0.0032 -3.5640
1988 0.0078 0.0032 2.4081
1989 -0.0233 0.0033 -7.1004
1990 -0.0412 0.0032 -12.8269
1991 -0.0161 0.0033 -4.9556
1992 0.0289 0.0032 9.0201
1993 0.0077 0.0033 2.3103
1994 -0.0279 0.0033 -8.4630
1995 0.0092 0.0032 2.9000
1996 -0.0008 0.0032 -0.2584
1997 0.0253 0.0032 7.8768
1998 0.0217 0.0032 6.8095
1999 -0.0100 0.0032 -3.1633
AOV
SSQ regression 0.3618 deg. freedom 19
SSQ error 0.2949 deg. freedom 677
SSQ total 0.6567 deg. freedom 696
R squared 55.0909
a. Decline in male labor force participation post age 49.
15adult increases with age. The magnitude of the rise for a household’s consumption over
s a y5 0y e a r si saf a c t o ro f2 . 9 2a c c o r d i n gt oTable 6a, and a factor of 2.41 according to
Table 6b. Since earnings (corrected for inﬂation) roughly double for a typical household as
it ages, these factors seem intuitively plausible. The negative estimates of β3 imply that a
household’s consumption declines in the year it retires. The estimated magnitude of the
drop for the year of retirement is 24% in Table 6a and 21% in Table 6b. The signs and
magnitudes of the change in consumption at retirement seem consistent with Bernheim et
al. [2001], Banks et al. [1998], a n dH u r da n dR o h w e d d e r[ 2 0 0 3 ] .
3. Calibration
This section modiﬁes our life—cycle saving model to include income taxes, social secu-
rity, and a nonnegativity constraint on net worth at each age. Bankruptcy laws presumably
lead to the latter constraint.9 Existing work has noted the possible eﬀect of binding con-
straints. For example, if the constraint binds consistently in youth, consumption growth
at early ages will mimic income growth – biasing upward Table 6’s constant term, and
presumably biasing downward our estimate of the adult equivalency of children. After
presenting the new model, we use it to extract key economic parameters from Section 2’s
reduced—form estimates. We can then check whether the parameter values lead to binding
liquidity constraints past age 30 (or 35 in the case of Table 6b) – in which case Section 2’s
estimation procedures need to be revised.
The new model is
max
ct,R
8 T
0
e−ρ·t · nt · u(
f(ct, t)
nt
)dt (11)
subject to:  t =
F
¯  , for t ≤ R
1, for t>R
,
˙ at = r · (1 − τ) · at +( 1−  t) · et · eg·t · Wt · (1 − τ − τss) + SSBt · (1 −
τ
2
) − ct ,
at ≥ 0a l lt,
a0 =0=aT .
The term et registers increases in “eﬀective labor supply” with experience; g i st h er a t eo f
labor—augmenting technological progress. As before, assume
f(c, )=[ c]α · [ ]1−α , α ∈ (0,1), and u(f)=
[f]γ
γ
, γ < 1. (12)
9 Note that the models of Stock and Wise [1990] and Rust and Phelan [1997], which as-
sume no saving, can be thought of as particular cases in which the nonnegativity constraint
binds at all ages.
16We solve (11) using Mariger’s [1986] algorithm – essentially determining (numerically)
one by one the age—intervals on which the liquidity constraint at ≥ 0 does, and does not,
bind.
We ﬁx a number of features of our model as follows. We assume each household has
two adults. Time 0 corresponds to the adults each being age 22; time T corresponds to
their being 76 (e.g., T =7 6−22 = 54). We set τ = .25 and τss = .1 3 .W ea s s u m eas o c i a l
security replacement rate of .44 if a household retires at 62 and the Social Security “normal
retirement age” is 65; if the normal retirement age is 67, our replacement rate for early
retirement at 62 is .39.10 We compute average lifetime wages up to age 62, multiplied by
this replacement rate. This is adjusted if beneﬁt sb e g i na f t e ra g e6 2i ns u c haw a yt h a tt h e
present value of lifetime beneﬁts remains the same (see the discussion in the next section).
Half of social security beneﬁts are subject to income tax. The aftertax (real) interest rate
is .05.
The age proﬁle of household earnings, the shape of which et determines, follows
Auerbach—Kotlikoﬀ [1987]. We, however, assume that technological progress raises wages
1% per year every year. Note that because preferences are homothetic, the scaling of the
earnings proﬁle – and the scaling of the lifetime proﬁle of equivalent adults – does not
aﬀect retirement age R or ∆ln(ct) or the magnitude of the discontinuous change in con-
sumption at retirement. (Nor does the scaling of equivalent adults or earnings aﬀect the
ratio of assets to earnings generated by the model.)
A household’s two adults both work the same hours: 40 hours per week until retire-
ment; 0 hours per week after retirement. With 16 × 7w a k i n gh o u r sp e rw e e k ,w es e t 11
¯   =
16 × 7 − 40
16 × 7
= .6429.
In some examples below we omit children and normalize nt = 1 all t. (This corresponds
to most of the analysis, for instance, in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987].) In other cases, we
assume that two children are born when a household’s adults are 24 and that the children
leave home to form their own families when their parents are 46. As stated above, the
normalization of our equivalent adults proﬁle is unimportant; nevertheless, the relative
size of nt at diﬀerent ages is signiﬁcant. Table 5 shows that we can only identify the
consumption weight ξC for children after we have determined gamma and alpha.
We set the key parameters ρ, α,a n dγ from the regression results of Tables 6a—b and
the empirical retirement age. Roughly speaking, we can think of the parameter estimate
/ β3, measuring the discontinuous drop in consumption upon retirement, as determining
γ: as noted above, a positive gamma leads to a rise in consumption at retirement, and a
negative gamma to a fall; thus, in terms of magnitudes, a gamma near 0 will tend to lead to
a small discontinuity, and a gamma far from zero to a large one. Alpha determines the role
10 See Gruber and Wise [2001, Tab.5.1, p.181]. For a normal retirement age of 67, this
paper multiplies .44 by Gruber and Wise’s replacement rate for 65 divided by the rate for
67.
11 Cf. Cooley and Prescott [1995]. On the basis of time—use studies, they determine that
households devote 1/3 of waking hours to work.
17of consumption relative to leisure in producing utility. If alpha is one, only consumption
matters, so a household should never retire. If alpha is zero, only leisure matters, so a
household should retire at age 22. Hence, we can expect information on the empirical
retirement age to help us set α. Finally, a higher rho implies greater impatience, hence,
less of a rise in consumption with age. We can then think of / β0, which measures the growth
rate of adult consumption with age, as determining rho.
Table 7 presents our calibrations. In the actual computations, we choose a prospective
value of γ, determine a corresponding α from / β3 (see Table 5), determine a corresponding ρ
from / β0, determine ξC from β1 and ξA from β2. Then we solve maximization problem (11)
for the desired retirement age. The sign of / β3 implies γ < 0. A grid search reveals the
model’s desired retirement age R rises monotonically as γ falls. The median retirement
age in our data (for each year 1984—2000) is between 63 and 64; so, Table 7 presents the
range of choices for γ which imply a retirement age between 63 and 64.12 Table 7 also
presents ranges for the corresponding α, ρ, ξC,a n dξA.
For none of the rows of Table 7 do household liquidity constraints bind at any age.
This is broadly consistent with Mariger’s [1986] ﬁndings. It seems to release us from having
to reconsider the speciﬁcation of Section 2’s reduced—form regression equation.
Our calibrated values of γ fall within the range of the existing literature. For example,
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987, p.50—51] suggest γ = −3; Zeldes [1989] suggests γ = −1;
Laitner [2002] suggests γ = .6 − .7; Cooley and Prescott [1995] assume γ = 0; Rust and
Phelan [1997] estimate γ = −.072; and, Stock and Wise [1990] have estimates ranging from
.632—.813. The values of ρ are also standard. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987,p.51] write,
“There is scant evidence of the appropriate value of [this parameter],” and they choose
.015. Cooley and Prescott [1995,p.22] choose .053.13
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ use a CES functional form for f(.) and their (“base case”)
choice for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is .8. They warn [p.51],
“There is far less direct empirical evidence concerning the value of [the elasticity of sub-
stitution].” A Cobb—Douglas f u n c t i o ni sas p e c i a lc a s eo faC E Sf u n c t i o nw i t hp r o d u c t i o n
elasticity of substitution equaling 1. Cooley and Prescott use the Cobb Douglas form,
and their calibrated value for alpha is .36. After minor algebraic manipulation, the utility
f u n c t i o no fS t o c ka n dW i s e[ 1 9 9 0 ]c a nb es e e nt o be the same as well. The Cobb—Douglas,
but no other CES function is compatible with constant labor supply in the face of secular
increases in wages and permanent changes in proportional wage—tax rates (see below);
recalling Section 1, our Cobb—Douglas speciﬁcation is therefore consistent with U.S. data
since 1940 provided factors such as rising social security beneﬁts prove suﬃcient to explain
a gradually falling male retirement age.
The estimated equivalency weight of two children relative to two adults in Table 6a is
2 × .0830
1+.1329
= .1465;
for Table 6b it is
12 Footnote 7 details the source of the retirement data.
13 See also Barsky et al. [1997].
182 × .0563
1+.1221
= .1003.
This compares to Tobin’s [1967] assumed adult equivalency of .3 for minor children and .7
for teenagers, and to Mariger’s estimated relative weight of .30.14 Equation (7) shows the
actual step up in consumption in going from two adults to two adults plus two children is
[
1+ξA +2· ξC
1+ξA ](1−γ)/(1−α·γ) .
For Table 6a the step in levels is 1.2472; for 6b it is 1.1581.15
The estimated equivalency weight for a second adult, 13% as much as the ﬁrst adult
in Table 6a and 12% in Table 6b, is quite low. Such a weight implies very substantial
economies of scale in household operation. There are several potentially interesting ramiﬁ-
cations: as the elderly choose more and more to live separately from their children, and as
rising divorce rates and, perhaps, later marriages, leave more young adults living alone, the
economy will more and more sacriﬁce these scale economies; and, the U.S. Social Security
System’s provision of 50% incremental beneﬁt payments for retired workers with spouses
may be more generous than equality of living standards for singles and couples requires.
A great advantage of our approach is that we can jointly employ data on retirement
ages and recent evidence on the drop in consumption after retirement to pin down alpha and
gamma i nam o r ed i r e c tw a yt h a np r e v i o u ss t u d i e sh a v eb ea b l et od o .N e v e r t h e l e s s ,a tt h i s
point, consensus estimates of the parameters from the existing literature are surprisingly
well borne out, with the possible exception of child and adult equivalency scalings.
4. Social Security Policy Implications
This section uses our calibrated parameters to ask how much of a reduction in labor
supply the present U.S. Social Security System causes. In our context, the reduction takes
place entirely through decisions of when to retire. The calibrations could, of course, yield
predictions of labor—supply responses to potential future changes in the Social Security
System (see, for example, President’s Commission [2001]).
There are several ways to think about social security’s inﬂuence on household labor
supply. One which is convenient here conceptually separates the impact of social security
taxes and beneﬁts, ﬁr s tc o m p a r i n ga ne c o n o m yw i t hn os o c i a ls e c u r i t yt oo n ew i t ht a x e sb u t
no beneﬁts, and second comparing an economy with social security taxes but no beneﬁts
t oo n ew i t hb o t ht a x e sa n db e n e ﬁts.
For the ﬁrst step, suppose society imposes a new proportional tax on earnings –
but there are no corresponding transfer payments (i.e., beneﬁts). Let the tax rate be
τss. Consider a household. With the new tax, the household’s time endowment is worth
only 1 − τss t i m e sa sm u c ha sb e f o r e .T h a ts h o u l dinduce the household to consume less
14 See also Browning et al. [1985].
15 Arguably these compare with Tobin’s equivalencies since most of Tobin’s analysis
assumes γ =0 .
19Table 7. Parameter Calibrations (see text)
γ α ρ ξC ξA
Table 6a coeﬃcients; no children
-1.30 to .3264 to .0195 to .0830 .1329
-1.31 .3286 .0194
Table 6a coeﬃcients; two children
-1.30 to .3264 to .0195 to .0830 .1329
-1.31 .3286 .0194
Table 6b coeﬃcients; no children
-1.03 .3139 .0267 .0563 .1221
Table 6b coeﬃcients; two children
-1.03 .3139 .0267 .0563 .1221
leisure and less goods – hence to supply more labor. Microeconomists refer to this as the
“income eﬀect” of the tax. On the other hand, since a tax falls upon work hours but not
leisure, it should induce the household to supply less labor relative to leisure. This is the
“substitution eﬀect.” A special property of a Cobb—Douglas home production function
f(.) is that a proportional tax’s income and substitution eﬀects on labor supply exactly
counterbalance one another, leaving desired labor supply unchanged.
Second, add social security beneﬁts. As society institutes beneﬁts, a typical household
is made better oﬀ, leading to an “income—eﬀect” increase in household demand for leisure
and goods, hence to a reduction in market labor supply. The “substitution eﬀect” from
beneﬁts is more complicated. To the extent that beneﬁts rise with retirement age, they
implicitly act as a subsidy to wage earnings, inducing households to substitute work for
leisure. The question is how large this inducement is. Consider an extra year of work
under the present U.S. system – i.e., consider retirement at, say, age R +1i n s t e a do f
R. The U.S. Social Security System’s “normal retirement age” is 65 and 8 months. Early
r e t i r e m e n t ,f o ra g e6 2o rl a t e r ,l e a d st oab e n e ﬁt reduction for any given AIME (see below).
Since this particular reduction is roughly neutral in terms of the expected present value of
a household’s lifetime beneﬁts, it has no substitution—eﬀect implications (e.g., Hurd and
Smith [2002]). At least two factors remain. (i) Upon retirement, a worker computes his
AIME (“average indexed monthly earnings”) from the average of his 35 highest earning
years. (For future reference, note that the calculation procedure removes the eﬀects of
inﬂation and secular earnings growth due to technological progress.) (ii) The worker then
computes his PIA (“primary insurance amount”) from a formula which provides more
generous beneﬁts at lower income: in the calculations below, which are based on 1995
data, a worker’s PIA equals 90% of his ﬁrst $426 of AIME, 32% of his next $2141, and
15% of higher amounts. Steps (i)—(ii) both attenuate the “substitution eﬀect” of social
security beneﬁts: in step (i), postponing retirement may provide a higher earning year for
20one’s 35—year average, but only the increment of the new year’s earnings over the earnings
it replaces counts; step (ii) reduces the marginal impact of an extra dollar of earnings by
10, 68, or 85%. In our numerical examples, a worker’s eﬀective labor supply, cleansed of
the eﬀect of technological progress, rises with age into his 40s but then falls. Because of the
latter fall, the step (i) correction is severe. For our representative worker, step (ii) provides
a marginal beneﬁt rate of 32%. In the end, an extra year of work at age 62 increases social
security beneﬁts only .04%.
For comparison, consider a private—sector deﬁned beneﬁt pension with proportion-
ate contributions in each working year. A worker of age 62 contemplating postponing
retirement for 1 more year can add a full year’s contribution to his pension account. The
percentage increase in the account in this case depends on all previous contributions and
their appreciation, and our computations assume a 5% annual interest rate. There is no
private—sector analogue to the step (ii) adjustment. In our sample computation, an extra
year of work at age 62 raises the deﬁned beneﬁt account 3.01% – almost two orders of
magnitude more than the social security case.16
In view of the tenuous linkage of social security beneﬁts and retirement age, the
remainder of our analysis simply ignores the substitution eﬀect of social security beneﬁts;
hence, social security reduces desired labor supply because of the “income eﬀect” of social
security beneﬁts.
Table 8a computes, for each of Table 7’s parameter combinations, the increase in the
desired retirement age for an economy without a social security system versus one with a
normal retirement age of 65; Table 8b performs the same calculations if the system’s normal
retirement age is 67. Note that the U.S. Social Security System’s normal retirement age
was 65 in 1995; it will be 67 in 2022. Social Security seems to shift the desired age of
retirement 3—4 years earlier when the normal retirement age is 65, and the same when it
is 67.
There are several reasons why the simulation results should be viewed as upper limits
for the eﬀect of social security on retirement. First, as stated, the analysis omits the im-
pact of health status. Declining health status clearly can aﬀect retirement plans, possibly
overwhelming the inﬂuence of economic incentives (e.g., Anderson et al. [1999]). Sec-
ond, business downturns may lead companies to oﬀer buy outs for early retirement (e.g.,
Brown [2002]). It is also the case that income heterogeneity complicates interpretation
of our results: social security beneﬁts tend to be a lower share of lifetime resources for
workers with higher earnings; thus, the impact of social security on the retirement age of
such workers will tend to be less.
We should note that the results in Tables 8a—b are positive rather than normative.
While a complete analysis of possible social security reforms would require, for instance,
a general equilibrium framework, this paper investigates a way of calibrating one key
c o m p o n e n to fs u c haf r a m e w o r k .
5. Conclusion
16 This analysis overlooks the facts (a) that social security beneﬁts are not fully taxed
under the U.S. income tax and (b) that balances in a deﬁned—beneﬁt—pension account will
accrue interest during retirement at the market rate.
21Table 8a. Desired Retirement Age without Social Security:
“Normal Retirement Age” 65a
Formulation Desired Age with Social Security Change
Desired
Present Absent Age
Tab. 5a coefs; 63 66 3
no children;
γ = −1.30 to -1.31
Tab. 5a coefs; 63 66 3
two children;
γ = −.130 to -1.31
Tab. 5b coefs; 63 67 4
no children;
γ = −1.03
Tab. 5b coefs; 63 67 4
two children;
γ = −1.03
a. Social security replacement rate .44 for early retirement age 62. See text.
Table 8b. Desired Retirement Age:
“Normal Retirement Age” 67a
Formulation Desired Age with Social Security Change
Desired
Present Absent Age
Tab. 5a coefs; 63 66 3
no children;
γ = −1.30 to -1.31
Tab. 5a coefs; 63 66 3
two children;
γ = −.130 to -1.31
Tab. 5b coefs; 63 67 4
no children;
γ = −1.03
Tab. 5b coefs; 63 67 4
two children;
γ = −1.03
a. Social security replacement rate .39 for early retirement age 62. See text.
22A number of recent papers measure a decline in average household consumption fol-
lowing retirement. One possible explanation is that people tend to plan poorly and must
subsequently retrench. Another is that households compensate themselves for working
hard before they retire with relatively high consumption, and they cease this extra spend-
ing after they retire.
Under the second story, one can use the sign and magnitude of the change in consump-
tion at retirement to calibrate parameters of the life—cycle saving model – in particular,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, an important, but otherwise
rather subtle, determinant of indiﬀerence—curve shapes. Using data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, this paper illustrates how this can be done.
When Section 4 employs the calibrated parameters to study the eﬀect of the existing
U.S. social security system on retirement behavior, the simulations point to a reduction in
the average retirement age of three to four years. Overlooking health status presumably
leads to overstatements. Nevertheless, results point to substantial consequences for labor
supply from potential future changes in social security.
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